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Abstract
We provide a two-sided inequality for the α−optimal partition
value of a measurable space according to n nonatomic finite mea-
sures. The result extends and often improves Legut (1988) since the
bounds are obtained considering several partitions that maximize the
weighted sum of the partition values with varying weights, instead of a
single one. Furthermore, we show conditions that make these bounds
sharper.
1 Introduction
Let (C, C) be a measurable space, µ1, . . . , µn be n nonatomic finite measures
defined on the same σ−algebra C, and let P be the set of all measurable
partitions (A1, . . . , An) of C (Ai ∈ C for all i = 1, . . . , n, ∪i∈NAi = C,
Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for all i 6= j). Let ∆n−1 denote the (n− 1)-dimensional simplex.
For this definition, and the many others taken from convex analysis, we refer
to [9].
Definition 1. A partition (A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n) ∈ P is said to be α−optimal, for
α = (α1, . . . , αn)
T ∈ int ∆n−1, if
vα := min
i=1,...,n
{
µi(A
∗
i )
αi
}
= sup
{
min
i=1,...,n
{
µi(Ai)
αi
}
: (A1, . . . , An) ∈P
}
. (1)
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This problem has a consolidated interpretation in mathematical eco-
nomics. We adopt the model considered in Dubins and Spanier [6]. C
is a non-homogeneous, infinitely divisible good to be distributed among n
agents with idiosyncratic preferences, represented by the measures. A parti-
tion (A1, . . . , An) ∈P describes a possible division of the good, with portion
Ai (not necessarily connected) given to agent i. A satisfactory compromise
between the conflicting interests of the agents, each having a relative claim
αi, i = 1, . . . , n, over the cake, is given by the α−optimal partition. It can
be shown that the proposed solution coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinski
solution for bargaining problems (See Kalai and Smorodinski [11] and Kalai
[10]). When {µi}i=1,...,n are all probability measures, i.e.. µi(C) = 1 for all
i = 1, . . . , n, the claim vector α = (1/n, . . . , 1/n)T describes a situation
of perfect parity among agents. The necessity to consider finite measures
stems from game theoretic extensions of the models, such as the one given
in Dall’Aglio et al. [4].
When all the µi are probability measures, Dubins and Spanier [6] showed
that if µi 6= µj for some i 6= j, then vα > 1. This bound was improved,
together with the definition of an upper bound by Elton et al. [8]. A further
improvement for the lower bound was given by Legut [12]. More recently,
Legut and Wilczyn´sky [16] give an explicit formula for the value of vα (and
of the corresponding optimal partition) for the case n = 2, based on the
Neyman-Pearson Lemma.
The aim of the present work is twofold: We provide further refinements
for Legut’s bounds for any n, and we show conditions that make these bounds
sharper. We consider here the same geometrical setting employed by Legut
[12], i.e. the partition range, also known as Individual Pieces Set (IPS) (see
Barbanel [2] for a thorough review of its properties), defined as
R := {(µ1(A1), . . . , µn(An)) : (A1, . . . , An) ∈P} ⊂ Rn+.
Let us consider some of its features. The set R is compact and convex (see
Dvoretzky ed al. [7]). The supremum in (1) is therefore attained. Moreover,
as shown by Legut and Wilczyn´sky [15],
vα = max{r ∈ R+ : (rα1, rα2, . . . , rαn)T ∩R 6= ∅}. (2)
So, the vector (vαα1, . . . , v
ααn)
T is the intersection between the Pareto fron-
tier of R and the ray rα = {(rα1, . . . , rαn)T : r ≥ 0}.
To find both bounds, Legut locates the solution of the maxsum prob-
lem sup {∑ni=1 µi(Ai) : (A1, . . . , An) ∈P} on the partition range. Then, he
finds the convex hull of this point with the corner points of the partition
range to find a lower bound, and uses a separating hyperplane argument to
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find the upper bound. We keep the same framework, but consider the solu-
tions of several maxsum problems with weighted coordinates to find better
approximations. Fix β = (β1, . . . , βn)
T ∈ ∆n−1 and consider
n∑
i=1
βiµi(A
β
i ) = sup
{
n∑
i=1
βiµi(Ai) : (A1, . . . , An) ∈P
}
. (3)
Let η be a non-negative finite-valued measure with respect to which each µi
is absolutely continuous (for instance we may consider η =
∑n
i=1 µi). Then,
by the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, for each A ∈ C,
µi(A) =
∫
A
fidη ∀ i = 1, . . . , n,
where fi is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µi with respect to η.
Finding a solution for (3) is straightforward:
Proposition 1. (see [6, Theorem 2], [1, Theorem 2] [3, Proposition 4.3])
Let β ∈ ∆n−1 and let Bβ = (Aβ1 , . . . , Aβn) be an n−partition of C. If
βkfk(x) ≥ βhfh(x) for all h, k ∈ N and for all x ∈ Aβk , (4)
then (Aβ1 , . . . , A
β
n) is optimal for (3).
Definition 2. Given β ∈ ∆n−1, an efficient value vector (EVV) with respect
to β, uβ = (uβ1 , . . . , u
β
n)
T , is defined by
uβi = µi(A
β
i ), for each i = 1, . . . , n.
The EVV uβ is a point where the hyperplane
Hβ = {x ∈ Rn : βTx = βTuβ} (5)
touches the partition range R, so uβ lies on the Pareto border of R.
2 The main result
As proved in Legut [12], one EVV alone associated to the equitable β is
enough to assure a lower bound. Here we give a general result for the case
where n linearly independent EVVs are available. We derive this approxima-
tion result through a convex combination of these easily computable points
in R, which lie around (vαα1, . . . , vααn)T .
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Theorem 1. Consider m ≤ n linearly independent vectors u1,u2, . . . ,um,
where ui = (ui1, ui2, . . . , uin)
T , i = 1, . . . ,m is the EVV associated to βi,
βi = (βi1, βi2, . . . , βin)
T ∈ ∆n−1. Assume
rank(u1, . . . ,um,α) = m , (6)
let U be the n × m matrix U = (u1,u2, . . . ,um) and let U¯ be an m × m
submatrix of U with det(U¯) 6= 0. Let α¯ be the vector obtained from α by
selecting the same rows as in U¯ . Then,
(i)
α ∈ cone(u1,u2, . . . ,um) (7)
if and only if
det(U¯) det(U¯αi) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, (8)
where U¯αi is the m×m matrix obtained by replacing the i−th column
of U¯ with α¯. Moreover, α ∈ ri(cone(u1,u2, . . . ,um)) if and only if all
the inequalities in (8) are strict.
(ii) For any choice of u1,u2, . . . ,um,
vα ≤ min
i=1,...,m
(
βi
)T
ui(
βi
)T
α
. (9)
Moreover, if (8) holds, then
1
eT U¯
−1
α¯
≤ vα (10)
where e = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rm.
Proof. To prove (i), let t = (t1, t2, . . . , tm)
T and consider, for any r > 0, the
linear system
Ut = rα (11)
with variables in t. By (6) this is equivalent to
U¯t = rα¯ , (12)
and, by Cramer’s rule, it admits the unique solution
t = r
(
det(U¯α1)
det(U¯)
, · · · , det(U¯αm)
det(U¯)
)T
. (13)
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Now, (7) holds if and only if ti ≥ 0 for every i = 1, . . . ,m, which in turn
holds if and only if (8) holds. Moreover, ti > 0 for every i = 1, . . . ,m if and
only if all the inequalities in (8) are strict.
To prove (ii), consider, for any i = 1, . . . ,m, the hyperplane (5) that
intersects the ray rα at the point (r¯iα1, . . . , r¯iαn), with
r¯i =
(
βi
)T
ui(
βi
)T
α
.
Since R is convex, the intersection point is not internal to R. So, r¯i ≥ vα
for i ∈ N , and, therefore, mini=1,...,m r¯i ≥ vα.
Assuming now that (8) holds, we choose r∗ > 0 so that the corresponding
t∗ in (13) satisfies
eT t∗ = 1 . (14)
r∗α is the convex combination of the vectors in U with weights in t∗, and is
aligned with α. By the convexity of R, r∗ provides a lower bound for vα.
System (12) implies t∗/r∗ = U¯−1α¯, and, by (14),
1
r∗
=
1
r∗
eT t∗ = eT U¯−1α¯ , (15)
which, in turn, implies (10).
Remark 1. In the corollaries and the examples that follow, we will consider
the situation where m = n. In such case, (6) is trivially satified, and an
easy geometric interpretation can be given to condition (8). For any j ∈ N ,
consider the hyperplane
H−j = {x ∈ Rn : det(u1, . . . ,uj−1,x,uj+1, . . . ,un) = 0} ,
passing through the origin and all the EVVs but uj. H−j separates uj and α
(weakly or strictly, resp.) if and only if (8) (weakly or strictly, resp.) holds.
In what follows, u1,u2, . . . ,um will be sometimes referred to as the sup-
porting set of EVVs for the lower bound.
We next consider two corollaries that provide bounds in case only one
EVV is available. The first one works with an EVV associated to an arbitrary
vector β ∈ ∆n−1.
Corollary 1. ([5, Proposition 3.4]) Let µ1, . . . , µn be finite measures and let
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un)
T be the EVV corresponding to β ∈ ∆n−1 such that
α−1j uj = max
i=1,...,n
α−1i ui. (16)
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Then,
uj
αj +
∑
i 6=j
[
µ−1i (C)(αiuj − αjui)
] ≤ vα ≤ βTu
βTα
. (17)
Proof. Consider the corner points of the partition range
ei = (0, . . . , µi(C), . . . , 0)
T ∈ Rn, i = 1, . . . , n
where µi(C) is placed on the i-th coordinate, and
U = (e1, . . . , ej−1,u, ej+1, . . . , en) .
Now
det(U) = uj
∏
i 6=j
µi(C) > 0
det(Uαj) = αj
∏
i 6=j
µi(C) > 0
and, for all i ∈ N \ {j}, by (16),
det(Uαi) = (αiuj − αjui)
∏
k 6=i,k 6=j
µk(C) ≥ 0 .
Therefore, U satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 1. Since U has inverse
U−1 =

1
µ1(C)
0 · · · − u1
µ1(C)uj
· · · 0
0 1
µ2(C)
· · · − u2
µ2(C)uj
· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
uj
· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · − un
µn(C)uj
· · · 1
µn(C)

,
the following lower bound is guaranteed for vα:
vα ≥ r∗ = uj
αj +
∑
i 6=j
[
µ−1i (C)(αiuj − αjui)
].
The upper bound is, again, a direct consequence of Theorem 1.
In case all measures µi are normalized to one and the only EVV considered
is the one corresponding to the equitable β, we obtain Legut’s result.
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Corollary 2. ([12, Theorem 3]) Let µ1, . . . , µn be probability measures and let
ueq = (ueq1 , u
eq
2 , . . . , u
eq
n )
T be the EVV corresponding to βeq = (1/n, . . . , 1/n)T .
Let ueqj = maxi=1,...,n u
eq
i . Then,
ueqj
ueqj − αj(K − 1)
≤ vα ≤ K, (18)
where K =
∑n
i=1 u
eq
i .
Proof. Simply apply Corollary 1 with µi(C) = 1, for all i ∈ N and βeq. Then
vα ≥ r∗ = u
eq
j
αj +
∑
i 6=j(αiu
eq
j − αjueqi )
=
ueqj
ueqj − αj(K − 1)
.
Finally, by Theorem 1, we have
vα ≤ (β
eq)T ueq
(βeq)T α
=
n∑
i=1
ueqi .
It is important to notice that the lower bound provided by Theorem 1
does not necessarily improve on Legut’s lower bound, but it certainly does
so when
cone(u1,u2, . . . ,um) ⊆ cone(e1, . . . , ej−1,ueq, ej+1, . . . , en) , (19)
for, in such case, conv(u1,u2, . . . ,um) lies above conv(e1, . . . , ej−1,ueq, ej+1, . . . , en),
and the first set of EVVs provides a better bound then the latter.
Example 1. We consider a [0, 1] good that has to be divided among three
agents with equal claims, α = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)T , and preferences given as
density functions of probability measures w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure
f1(x) = 1 f2(x) = 2x f3(x) = 30x(1− x)4 x ∈ [0, 1] ,
f3 being the density function of a Beta(2, 5) distribution. The preferences of
the players are not concentrated (following Definition 12.9 in Barbanel [2])
and therefore there is only one EVV associated to each β ∈ ∆2 (cfr. [2],
Theorem 12.12)
The EVV corresponding to βeq = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)T is
ueq = (0.0501, 0.75, 0.8594)T .
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Figure 1: The density functions in Example 1. Agent 1: tiny dashing; Agent 2: large
dashing; Agent 3: continuous line.
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Consequently, the bounds provided by Legut are
1.3437 ≤ vα ≤ 1.6594.
Consider now two other vectors in ∆2, β
1 = (13/24, 6/24, 5/24)T and β2 =
(3/12, 8/12, 1/12)T , which generate the following EVVs
u1 = (1, 0, 0)T and u2 = (0.1875, 0.9648, 0)T .
The vectors u1,u2 and ueq satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and the
inclusion (19). The improved bounds are
1.3559 ≤ vα ≤ 1.625.
The next example shows that linearly independent (dependent, resp.)
vectors {βi}i=1,...,m do not necessarily lead to linearly independent (depen-
dent, resp.) EVVs {ui}i=1,...,m.
Example 2. Consider again a [0, 1] good to be divided among three agents,
and preferences given by the following density functions w.r.t. the Lebesgue
measure
f1(x) = (2/3) I[0,1/2)(x) + (4/3) I(1/2,1](x) ,
f2(x) = 2 I[0,2/5)(x) + (1/3) I(2/5,1](x) ,
f3(x) = (1/2) I[0,3/4)(x) + (5/2) I(3/4,1](x) ,
IA(x) being the indicator function of the set A.
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To the following three linearly independent vectors in ∆2
β1 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)T β2 = (2/5, 1/5, 2/5)T β3 = (1/4, 1/3, 5/12)T
we associate, respectively, the optimal partitions
B1 = B2 = ((2/5, 3/4), [0, 2/5), (3/4, 1]),
B3 = ((1/2, 3/4), [0, 2/5), (2/5, 1/2) ∪ (3/4, 1]) .
Consequently,
u1 = u2 = (2/5, 4/5, 5/8)T u3 = (1/3, 4/5, 27/40)T ,
which are linearly dependent. On the other hand, considering
β4 = (0, 0, 1)T β5 = (1/6, 1/6, 2/3)T
we have
B4 = (∅,∅, [0, 1]) and B5 = B3
and
u4 = (0, 0, 1) and u5 = u3
Now β1,β4,β5 are linearly dependent, while the corresponding EVVs are
not.
Establishing sufficient conditions that guarantee the linear independence
(or dependence) of the EVVs remains an open issue.
3 Improving the bounds
The bounds for vα depend on the choice of the EVVs that satisfy the hy-
potheses of Theorem 1. Any new EVV yields a new term in the upper bound.
Since we consider the minimum of these terms, this addition is never harmful.
Improving the lower bound is a more delicate task, since we should modify
the set of supporting EVVs for the lower bound. When we examine a new
EVV we should verify whether replacing an EVV in the old set will bring to
an improvement.
The following Theorem provides simple tests to verify whether such re-
placement will bring an improvement in the bound and indicates how to
make the replacement.
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Theorem 2. Let u∗,u1, . . . ,um be m+ 1 EVVs, m ≤ n, with
rank(u∗,u1, . . . ,um) = m (20)
and the last m vectors linearly independent and satisfying conditions (6) and
(8). Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm, xk ≥ 0 for every k = 1, . . . ,m, and
y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Rm, respectively be the unique solutions of the following
linear systems of equations
Ux =
m∑
k=1
xku
k = α (21)
Uy =
m∑
i=1
yiu
i = u∗ (22)
with U = (u1, . . . ,um). Take j ≤ m such that yj 6= 0. Then, replacing
uj with u∗ in u1, . . . ,um, the EVVs are linearly independendent and satisfy
assumption (6) of Theorem 1. Moreover, the same EVVs satisfy assumption
(7) in Theorem 1 if and only if
yj > 0 for some j ≤ m xk ≥ yk
yj
xj for all k 6= j . (23)
When (23) holds, the same replacement also yields a sharper lower bound if
and only if
xj > 0 and
m∑
k=1
yk > 1 . (24)
Proof. Let U¯ be an m × m submatrix of U with det(U¯) 6= 0 and let U ∗
denote the matrix obtained from U by replacing uj, the j-th column of U ,
with u∗. Finally, let U¯ ∗ be the submatrix of U ∗ with the same selection of
rows operated in U¯ . Since
det(U¯
∗
) = yj det(U¯)
then yj 6= 0 implies that the vectors u1, . . . ,uj−1,u∗,uj+1, . . . ,um are lin-
early independent.
Consider now a solution x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
m) of the system of linear equa-
tions
U ∗x∗ =
∑
k 6=j
x∗ku
k + x∗ju
∗ = α. (25)
Since, (22) holds, we can write (25) as∑
k 6=j
x∗ku
k + x∗j
(
m∑
i=1
yiu
i
)
= α
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which, when yj 6= 0, has the unique solution x∗k = xk − ykyj xj for k 6= j, and
x∗j =
xj
yj
, with rank(U ∗,α) = m. Moreover , x∗k ≥ 0 for every k = 1, . . . ,m,
and α belongs to the cone generated by u1, . . . ,uj−1,u∗,uj+1, . . . ,um, if and
only if (23) holds.
A comparison of the linear system (21) with (11) and (14) shows that the
lower bound r∗ provided by Theorem 1 can be written as
r∗ =
1∑m
k=1 xk
.
Now
∑m
k=1 x
∗
k <
∑m
k=1 xk if and only if(
m∑
k=1
yk − 1
)
xj
yj
> 0 .
Therefore, (23) and (24) imply that the new set of EVVs provides a strictly
sharper lower bound.
Theorem 2 could, in principle, be applied iteratively by verifiying the
assumpions of the Theorem for each new EVV. It must be noted, however,
that when m < n we do not know about general reasonable conditions to
generate a new EVV in the linear span of the current supporting set of EVVs,
so to make (20) hold (see Example 2 in the previous Section).
The same assumption, however, is trivially satisfied when m = n. More-
over, Theorem 2 guarantees that the new set of EVVs u∗, {ui}i 6=j, which
provides an improved lower bound, is linearly independent, and this new
supporting set can be compared with a new EVV for a further application
of the theorem. In the example that follows we consider an instance of the
iterative procedure.
Example 1 (Continued). We consider a list of 1’000 random vectors in ∆2
and, starting from the supporting set e1, e2 and e3, we iteratively pick each
vector in the list. If this satisfies conditions (23) and (24), then the supporting
set is updated. The update occurs 22 times and the resulting EVVs are
u1 = (0.5356, 0.5128, 0.3857)T
u2 = (0.4592, 0.4887, 0.5780)T
u3 = (0.5562, 0.4384, 0.4524)T
corresponding, respectively, to
β1 = (0.4612, 0.3304, 0.2084)T
β2 = (0.4484, 0.3136, 0.2380)T
β3 = (0.4674, 0.3119, 0.2207)T
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with bounds shrinking to
1.48514 ≤ vα ≤ 1.48978.
The previous example shows that updating the supporting set through
a random selection of the new candidates is rather inefficient, since it takes
little less than 50 new random vectors, on average, to find a valid replacement
for supporting EVVs.
A more efficient method picks the candidate EVVs through some accurate
choice of the corresponding values of β. In [5] a subgradient method is
considered to find the value of vα up to any specified level of precision. In
that algorithm, the bounds provided by Corollary 1 are used, but these can
be replaced by the sharper bounds suggested by Theorem 1.
Example 1 (Continued). Considering the improved subgradient algorithm,
we obtain the following sharper bounds
1.48771 ≤ vα ≤ 1.48772
after 25 iterations of the algorithm in which, at each repetition, a new EVV
is considered. Bounds with the same precision (< 10−5) would have required
30 iterations using the algorithm described in [5].
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